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Summary 
The concept of humanitarian arms control emerged in the context of the new security 
challenges of the 21st century. The 1997 Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, the 2001 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions all set out to introduce arms control instruments to 
regulate not only uncontrolled transfers of arms, but also to end or to limit the 
indiscriminate use of weapons, and to deal with the long-term effects following intra-state 
conflicts. The three institutions share similar characteristics and thus permit the 
conclusion that a structural change has taken place in arms control and disarmament. 
This change is a consequence of the changed security environment after the end of the 
Cold War: Fragile statehood, economic under-development, internal state conflicts, 
terrorism and transnational organized crime provided the international state community 
with new challenges calling for different and new forms of arms control.  
This report identifies the indicators for this change and examines the reasons for the 
development of particular forms of arms control and disarmament. The three regimes 
banning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and restricting the illicit trafficking 
of small arms and light weapons all show similar characteristics which were decisive for 
their evolution and have given a new face to arms control as a whole. The key normative 
agents that were decisive for this structural change included transnational campaigns by 
non-governmental organizations as well as a number of small and medium-sized states. 
These alliances managed to get the arms control agreements off the ground despite 
opposition from the leading powers. Two factors were remarkable: On the one hand, the 
special negotiating formats which were set up for the Ottawa and Oslo processes and, on 
the other hand, “new diplomacy”, which was characterized by a mutual “give and take” 
between the different actors. By involving NGOs, like-minded states sought global public 
support and gained additional legitimacy for their ambivalent undertaking. By granting 
civil society stakeholders the right to participate in the negotiations, these states also 
enabled NGOs to gain certain influence on the norm generation processes. 
The change of perspective on arms control also becomes visible in a different, 
individualized understanding of security. Instead of concentrating exclusively on 
improving state’s security, attention is now being increasingly directed towards human 
security. Embedded in the concept of “human security”, one finds references to larger 
concepts such as development aims and conflict resolution practices. Humanitarian arms 
control is concerned with mitigating the consequences of the use of weapons as well as 
their deliberate misuse during and following intra-state conflicts. This new understanding 
of arms control lies within the wider context of security sector reform, which seeks to 
make fragile states capable of guaranteeing public security again, but it also addresses 
individual human needs in post-conflict situations such as victim rehabilitation and 
reintegration.  
The new arms control and disarmament agreements are an outcome of specific norm-
generating processes which are to be seen in the context of “new humanitarianism”. The 
most visible expression and, at the same time, probably the most controversial expression 
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of this new humanitarianism are a number of military interventions in response to gross 
violations of human rights and the deliberate disregard of international humanitarian law, 
as for example in Ruanda or Bosnia. Questions of justice are becoming the direct 
legitimization for state action and have also inspired and triggered norm-generation 
processes in other policy fields – for example, the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Moral convictions or questions of justice also motivated norm 
generating actors in the field of humanitarian arms control. In all three cases under 
consideration, the need for a new institution was determined by the moral conviction that 
action must be taken against numerous incidents of severe injustice where innocent 
people and civilians were killed or wounded by the indiscriminate use of these weapons in 
cases of intra-state conflicts. This conviction is based on one of the few global concepts of 
justice in international relations which is also anchored in international humanitarian 
law, such as the principle of need and proportionality. At the same time, this moral 
conviction has provided the basis for norm development in the field of humanitarian 
arms control: The suffering of the civilian population as a result of the use of anti-
personnel mines or cluster munitions prompted non-governmental organizations to 
demand of states to take action and seek a norm banning the use of such weapons.  
Certain convictions of justice, which seem to be shared in the international system of 
states, were finally enshrined in the principles, norms and procedures of the three 
regimes. According to the principle of equality, for example, all states parties must 
renounce the use of anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions and compile an overview 
of their national stocks of small arms. A further characteristic of humanitarian arms 
control is the comprehensive application of the principles of proportionality, need and 
compensation. For example, the costs-by-cause principle applies to the clearance of 
cluster munitions. Those states which are particularly affected can rely on technical as 
well as financial support under the Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and the Programme of 
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. 
This structural change towards humanitarian arms control is significant for arms 
control and for disarmament as a whole. However, the moral convictions and the 
principles of justice demanded by the NGOs in particular touched the limits of national 
and national security interests. Normative conflicts occurred in the negotiating processes 
of all three regimes; particularly over question of the appropriate definition of weapons 
categories, but also with regard to the possible renunciation of sovereignty, for example 
banning transfers of arms to non-state actors or prohibiting the private possession of 
weapons. Although the principles of proportionality, necessity and compensation and the 
recognition of the special needs of the affected states provided an important impetus for 
the negotiations, the actual implementation process, particularly of the PoA, has been 
very slow.  
Despite this ambivalence, the need for further norms and institutions in humanitarian 
arms control remains high. One of the core gaps is the lack of global norms limiting 
global arms transfer. The seizure of a ship – headed for Zimbabwe carrying weapons from 
China – by dock workers in South Africa once again revealed those regulatory gaps, 
which the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is now attempting to close. This initiative was also 
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prompted by a transnational network of non-governmental organizations and is 
supported by a number of states, including the Member States of the European Union, 
which adopted the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports in 2008. The ATT could 
become an important touchstone for humanitarian arms control as its global principles 
for arms transfers hit the very nerve of state security interests: State representatives must 
now show their colors and reveal what importance they attach to the moral convictions of 
global justice and legal principles of a future world society.  
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1.  Introduction 
The decade of “human security” was fundamental for humanitarian arms control in many 
respects1 (Shaw et al. 2006: 3). The concept of individualized security was introduced into 
the global debate in 1994 with the Human Development Report of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Although state security concepts were predominant 
during the Cold War, there were nevertheless also ground-breaking attempts to put an 
end to the closely defined military security discourse and to develop concepts for a more 
socially just world, for example the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions at the beginning 
of the 1980s.2 In this context, Jones also speaks of “broadening and deepening the 
conceptualisation of security” (Jones 1996: 6). It was also an attempt of channeling state’s 
attention towards global challenges and problems. By calling a security problem by its 
name, one signals an extraordinary emergency situation which justifies certain state´s 
action (Buzan et al. 1998). At the same time, the academic debate dealt critically with 
attempts to enlarge the security concept (Ulbert/Werthes 2008; Tadjbakhsh/Chenoy 
2007). Nevertheless, the focus on “human security” succeeded in establishing a changed 
normative framework, introducing ethical aspects of individual human well-being as well 
as development policy objectives and human rights into the otherwise static security 
policy debate and attracting the attention of the international community. 
Norm development in the field of humanitarian arms controls also benefited from this 
situation. The change in security perspectives encouraged the establishment of a different 
form of arms control and disarmament. This report sets out to examine the particularities 
of the norm formation processes in humanitarian arms control and to develop the thesis 
of a structural change. This change in form is demonstrated by various indicators such as 
the individualized security perspective described above as well as a strong moral rhetoric, 
which led to political action and concrete norm generation. It is also apparent in 
particular settings of negotiation processes and different constellations of stakeholders 
which were important for the successful outcome of the negotiations. 
 
 
1  Humanitarian arms control is considered to be the development of new norms in the field of landmines, 
small arms and cluster munitions which were negotiated and approved outside existing conventions on 
international humanitarian law. Humanitarian arms control was the consequence of the misuse of 
weapons against the civilian population in internal state conflicts, but also of the dissatisfaction of 
numerous states with the norms of international humanitarian law. The aim of these regimes – and thus 
the central reason for their establishment– is to alleviate human suffering by a total ban on, or the 
improved control of, these weapons. Cf. Green (2000: 17). 
2  www.brandt21forum.info/About_BrandtCommission.htm; www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm (5.10.2009). 
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The regimes3 of humanitarian arms control and disarmament were all negotiated in 
the new context of a stronger multilateralism. New coalitions of stakeholders can be 
identified and in some cases non-state actors gained direct access to the negotiation fora. 
The starting point, in 1992, was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 
which sought to achieve a global ban on these indiscriminate weapons.4 The process to 
negotiate the 1997 Ottawa Convention marked the beginning of a series of negotiating 
activities which were characterized by cooperation between certain states as well as non-
governmental organizations. Efforts to curb the globalized and increasingly illicit 
trafficking of small arms and light weapons also involved a transnational coalition of 
NGOs as well as a group of particularly committed states that were decisive for the 
development of the new institution. The recently negotiated ban on cluster munitions, the 
so-called Oslo Convention, was also initiated by like-minded states in cooperation with 
non-governmental organizations.5 
However, it is not only this new and extensive cooperation in the field of arms control 
between a group of states and a transnational coalition of non-governmental 
organizations which exemplifies the structural change in arms control. All three regimes 
share similar characteristics, even though they were negotiated in different forums and 
show divergent outcomes with regard to their universality and their legally binding 
character. In comparison to classical arms control, the peculiarities become more visible: 
They focus on preventing war between states, easing tension between states, limiting 
damage in the event of war, and reducing the cost of an arms race. Humanitarian arms 
control developed as a consequence of the misuse of weapons in internal state conflicts. 
Its aim is to reduce tension between conflict groups and to curb violence in the aftermath 
of civil wars. It aims to help states to become more capable of acting in the security sector 
but, at the same time, places the protection of individual security at the center of its 
normative principles. Because humanitarian arms control developed in close connection 
with the discourse on “human security”, it also attaches central importance to the 
protection of civilians and the rehabilitation of victims.  
 
 
3  Regimes in this context are understood to be “cooperative institutions which are characterized by 
informal and formal, legal and non-legalized structures – principles, norms, regulations and procedures – 
and deal with conflicts between rival states (occasionally also by involving other stakeholders)”. Cf. Müller 
(1993: 26). Rittberger/Meyer add that regimes must have an effect, that is to say, must induce a change of 
behavior on the part of states (Rittberger/Meyer 1993: 9). 
4  Article 51 defines indiscriminate attacks, as attacks which “employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, the effects of which cannot be limited as required by 
this Protocol, and which consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
5  Cluster bombs or munitions are generally defined as “large weapons which are deployed from the air and 
from the ground and release dozens or hundreds of smaller submunitions. Submunitions released by air-
dropped cluster bombs are most often called ‘bomblets’, while those delivered from the ground by 
artillery or rockets are usually referred to as ‘grenades’”. Cf. www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem 
(7.12.2009). 
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Individually negotiated solutions are typical of the structural change in humanitarian 
arms control – the norm generation processes in the case of the conventions banning 
anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions took place outside existing international 
organizations such as the United Nations or the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. 
These processes dispensed with universality, which is to say that they did not succeed to 
involve the entire community of states. The 2001 PoA, on the other hand, which was 
negotiated within the framework of the United Nations, was able to establish a regime 
that was universal but at the same time only politically binding. In contrast to the 
stigmatization and ban of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, norm-building 
activities in the field of small arms aim at arms control and disarmament, whilst 
acknowledging legitimate state security interests. The general structural change is also 
demonstrated by the offers of assistance for affected states; for example, technical support 
for mine clearance or the disarmament of surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons.  
However, this report does not only consider the structural changes in arms control 
and disarmament, but also focuses on the stakeholders responsible for norm 
development. The new form of arms control is characterized first and foremost by the 
overriding moral principles which determine the coexistence of states as well as their 
people in the world society and are also embodied in the norms of humanitarian arms 
control. The agents of norm generation – primarily the non-governmental organizations 
– based their demands for new forms of arms control on existing principles and norms, 
for example codified human rights or international humanitarian law, and here in 
particular on “justice in war” (jus in bello). When calling for new regimes, they pointed 
out fundamental elements of injustice whereby innocent people are killed and injured 
through the indiscriminate use of these types of weapons, and referred to the few 
universal principles of justice in the field of international relations (Shklar 1997: 30). 
Humanitarian arms control must therefore also be seen in the context of the “new 
humanitarianism” which emerged after the end of the Cold War as a consequence to 
changing security policy needs (Finnemore 1997: 197-224). Other institutions and norms 
such as the International Criminal Court or the “Responsibility to Protect” emerged and 
referred to similar principles of universal justice. 
In addition to these more general moral principles, other ideas of distributive justice 
can also be found in the norm-generating processes – the principles of compensation and 
need are particularly prominent in humanitarian arms control, where the focus lies on 
recognizing particular security needs (Johansen 2000: 209-230; Hurrell et al. 2003: 36ff). 
Principles of distributive justice can also be found in classic arms control regimes, for 
example in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty or the 1993 Convention on Chemical 
Weapons, but moral principles and justifications as a whole tend to play a more 
prominent role in humanitarian arms control, as this report will show.  
As remarkable as the structural change in humanitarian arms control may be, moral 
convictions and principles of justice reach their limits when it comes to state security 
interests. The ambivalence of norm development is the result of the ambiguity of the 
prevailing reference bases: According to Article 51of the UN Charter, states have the right 
of self-defense, which also includes the possession of conventional arms. This leads to 
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conflicts over norms in the negotiating processes, which have been solved in various ways 
according to the different negotiating forms of the three regimes. Whereas it was not 
possible to achieve universal membership in the cases of anti-personnel mines and cluster 
munitions, the PoA was forced to abandon certain controversial norms. The report will 
study this ambivalence in norm development in humanitarian arms control – which 
staggers between universal principles of justice and particularistic/national security 
interests – before finally considering questions of future needs and paths for further 
progress in this field. A new alliance between like-minded states and a transnational 
coalition of non-governmental organizations is currently being established with the aim 
of negotiating a legally binding arms trade treaty (ATT).  
Chapter 2 will look at the question of norm development and structural change in 
humanitarian arms control from a theoretical point of view. What role do principles of 
morality and justice play with regard to state cooperation in security policy and norm 
generation processes in the sector of arms control and disarmament? Chapter 3 focuses 
on the processes of regime formation and describes the problems arising from the 
deliberate misuse of certain conventional weapons in intra-state conflicts. Of the types of 
weapons under consideration, only cluster munitions have been deployed predominantly 
in interstate conflicts in the past; however, their impact is similar to that of anti-personnel 
mines. Chapter 3.1 deepens the study of regime demand by looking at norm generation 
processes which have taken place within the framework of international humanitarian law 
and seeks to identify the gaps in its provisions. In Chapter 4, the report reflects upon the 
stakeholders in the three norm generation processes: What were the argumentative 
justifications that prompted states to act? What role did moral principles and references 
to principles of justice play in this context? Who were the stakeholders and what are their 
particular characteristics? Chapter 5 is devoted to empirical case studies and specific 
norm development: What distinguishes humanitarian arms control? What is special 
about the formulation of its principles, norms and rules? Chapter 6 goes on to study the 
ambivalence of moral motives and national security interests and its consequences for 
norm development. 
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2.  Morality and justice as impetus for negotiations in  
arms control and disarmament 
Norm-building processes are important for the development of various institutions 
within a broad understanding of arms control and disarmament. Not only do they include 
ways to regulate arms races and deal with existing arsenals, they also cover issues of non-
proliferation, disarmament, the regulation of the use of weapons, and finally the 
elimination of entire categories of weapons (Becker et al. 2008: 15). They can also specify 
the use of weapons in wars as it is the case in international humanitarian law with its 
principles of proportionality and discrimination. Finally, the norm-building processes 
within this broad understanding of arms control also include the grafting of weapons 
taboos, in other words, a normative understanding on their non-use which can pave the 
way for arms control policy agreements, as was the case with chemical and nuclear 
weapons, for example (Price/Tannenwald 1996: 114). This kind of taboo is based on 
universally recognized humanitarian principles – or moral convictions of right or wrong – 
which deter the majority of states from using these weapons. Such universal principles are 
codified inter alia in international humanitarian law; for example, in the form of the 
unconditional protection of the civilian population during armed conflicts or the 
renunciation of particularly cruel weapons (Yihdego: 2007: 196). 
International relations theories offer different approaches on how norms can emerge. 
Generally speaking, norms are considered to be “collectively shared standards of 
appropriate behavior on the basis of the given identities of a community” (Deitelhoff 
2006: 14). Cooperative institutions come about with the lasting support of powerful states, 
or when stakeholders have complementary interests. Such rationalist approaches cannot, 
however, explain the success of norm-building processes in those cases where hegemonic 
states are skeptical or even hostile towards the institutions concerned. These were the 
conditions prevailing in the three examples of humanitarian arms control (Wisotzki 2008: 
177-198): It was possible to establish the institutions despite the fact that the United 
States, Russia and China either did not participate in the negotiating processes at all, or 
only very reluctantly.  
To realize moral convictions or ideas of justice in security policy and arms control, or 
even the fact that they are considered guiding elements in the norm-building processes, 
would seem at first sight to be contra-intuitive. According to the theory of neo-realism, 
states cannot be led by principles of justice, but must rely on their own strengths and self-
help strategies to ensure their survival (Thompson 1992: 2). Special principles determine 
the course of negotiations as far as security policy and classic arms control are concerned, 
because, even after a cooperative institution has been established, there is still an incentive 
to violate the treaty and secure unilateral benefit. Security policy institutions derive their 
effectiveness above all from the binding force of their norms and rules as well as from the 
monitoring procedures and sanctioning mechanisms in the case of eventual norm 
violations. But apart from this form of legality, they also need a certain degree of 
legitimacy which is based on “the subjective and material consensus of institutions with 
social ideas of justice” (Daase 2003: 9). 
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Michael Walzer refutes the global skepticism of neo-realism in his attempt to 
categorize just and unjust wars by referring to the fact that politics consists of decision-
making processes into which moral considerations are permanently being introduced.6 
Warfare – as well as its prevention through arms control – is permeated by normativity 
and moral considerations (Nolan 1995: 26). Such principles set standards for right and 
proportional behavior in conflict situations and are codified as international 
humanitarian law or stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.7 
If utilitarian or rationalist explanations are not able to adequately explain cooperation 
in these cases of arms control, one must consider other aspects. Sociological or 
constructivist approaches indicate that states also cooperate in the realm of security 
because they are incorporated in social systems which provide guidelines for appropriate 
behavior and encourage further norm-building processes (Katzenstein 1996). For 
example, the model of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines was helpful for the 
negotiations to ban cluster munitions. Stakeholders act as social beings on the basis of 
their experiences, habits and intuitions. Appropriateness as the basis for action indicates 
that stakeholders consider their role in the international community when choosing 
alternatives for action or solutions, and act on the basis of collective, moral convictions. 
In other words, they refer to existing, internationally recognized standards such as the 
norm of sovereignty or principles which are firmly anchored in international 
humanitarian law (Hashmi/Lee 2004: 12). The “claim to absoluteness of moral 
judgments” implies that the particular objectives and interests of social actors are 
subjected to a normative evaluation of their rightness and importance. This is the highest 
level of evaluation for individual behavior as well as for social institutions (Hasenclever 
2001: 118). The normative context must therefore be taken into consideration in order to 
assess the reasons for the development of new norms (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 887-917). 
I have already briefly described the basis of action for the development of norms in the 
field of humanitarian arms control. A certain kind of a “new humanitarianism” emerged as a 
consequence and reaction to the genocide in former Yugoslavia and Ruanda in the early 
1990s, which recognized not only states but also individuals – particularly the unprotected 
civilians – as legal subjects. Basic principles of this form of humanitarianism can already be 
found in the origins of international humanitarian law, which were codified in the 1949 
Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians in times of war. During the Cold War, 
 
 
6  Walzer’s book is often interpreted as developing “just reasons” for the use of violence – in fact Walzer is 
primarily interested in substantiating people’s right to peace and justice (Walzer 1997). Cf. Brown (2002: 
103-104). 
7  Overriding standards of appropriateness are often disputed and are frequently criticized as “western 
values”. In fact, the theory of the “just war” developed from Christian tradition and is not reflected in this 
form in any other religion. The same applies to the norm of human rights after 1945, which was 
repeatedly criticized as being predominantly western (Brown 2002: 119). 
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states sometimes also justified their interventionism with humanitarian claims of justice8, but 
in general principles of non-interference and state sovereignty tended to dominate the 
debates.9 The end of the Cold War coincided with a change of perspective: The principles of 
non-interference and state sovereignty were diluted in favor of a new form of humanitarian 
interventionism. 
The central aim of this “new humanitarianism” is to redress a fundamental state of 
injustice: namely the mass murder and injury of innocent civilians who are not part of the 
combat operations. A number of military interventions in crisis and conflict areas, including 
Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, were the most visible expression and, at the same time, probably 
the most controversial element of this humanitarianism. The discourse justifying 
humanitarian interventions always refers to overriding moral principles such as the duty of 
human solidarity in the face of massive violations of human rights (Wheeler 2000: 34). Issues 
of justice thus became the immediate basis for action and inspired the development of norms 
on a global level, for example in the field of international criminal justice or humanitarian 
arms control.  
In international negotiation settings, questions of justice are an important topic on 
various levels. They can accelerate the norm-generating processes, as shown by the 
example of “new humanitarianism”. But they also play a role in the negotiations 
themselves, for example when questions of procedural or distributive justice are involved. 
Druckman/Albin have studied the significance of questions of justice for negotiations, in 
particular in peace negotiations following civil wars. Procedural justice plays a role on 
various levels: for example, as the condition under which negotiations take place at all (for 
instance: Which conflict parties may take part?), but also during the actual negotiation 
process and in the conclusion of the final outcome. This is where questions of distributive 
justice also come into play, or become the central object of negotiation (Albin/ Druckman 
2008).  
Questions of distributive justice can be resolved on basis of the guidelines of the 
following four principles:  
1.  Principle of equality: Identical or comparable distribution of resources, costs and 
rights.  
2.  Principle of proportionality: Differentiation of resources according to the different 
starting positions and living conditions of the conflict parties. 
 
 
8  According to Wheeler, India justified its war against Pakistan in 1971 primarily with the right to self-
defense but also cited humanitarian reasons for rescuing the Bengalis (Wheeler 2000: 55). 
9  Belloni rightly points out that humanitarianism is not new but is already to be found in the great religions 
as a leading principle of solidarity (help for the weak). It was anchored in international humanitarian law 
at the instigation of Henry Dunant, the founder of the Committee of the Red Cross. Cf. Belloni (2007: 
452). 
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3.  Principle of compensation: Distribution of resources as compensation for injustice 
suffered or costs incurred. 
4.  Principle of need: Distribution of resources as support to provide basic needs. 
Numerous examples during the Cold War indicate that these principles already played a 
role in classical arms control, although they did not always lead to conflict-free solutions. 
Arms control negotiations were made more difficult due to differences in notions of 
justice – this was demonstrated, for example, by the arms control negotiations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, when differing ideas of justice 
initially made negotiations difficult (Müller 1994: 34). Nevertheless, there too, the parties 
succeeded in establishing a regime, and principles of justice certainly played an important 
role in the negotiation processes. The negotiations on SALT I and II were informed by the 
justice principles of equality and reciprocity, for example, when it came to negotiating the 
ceilings for strategic nuclear weapons (Albin 2001: 184-185). Multilateral arms control is 
characterized by the fact that states are granted equal rights and obligations; for example, 
under the 1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons, all states had to destroy their old 
stocks in equal measure. One exception is the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty which 
recognized the status quo of the five nuclear weapons states indefinitely, although Article 
VI does call upon them to pursue nuclear disarmament.10 The principles of 
proportionality and need are also applied in classical arms control, for instance, by 
granting states in need the right to both technical and financial assistance (Albin 2001: 
187).  
Aspects of justice in negotiation processes also play an important role in humanitarian 
arms control and have provided a crucial momentum for norm-building activities in this 
area. In particular, the principles of proportionality, compensation and need have played 
a certain role in the negotiation processes, as this report will demonstrate. Aspects of 
justice were already decisive in the run-up to the negotiating processes: Accordingly, the 
need for normative agreements and multilateral negotiations were justified on the basis of 
moral principles and reasons of justice.  
 
 
10  The nuclear weapons states claimed, however, that this commitment was only to be seen in conjunction 
with the general and complete disarmament of all weapons systems. Cf. Wisotzki (2001: 228). 
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3.  The starting position: Regime demand and the development of 
humanitarian arms control 
Statistics on the incidence of global wars provide some cause for optimism: The number 
of large-scale wars with more than 1,000 fatalities is dwindling; the overall number of 
conflicts has dropped by more than 40 percent since 1992.11 Since the 1950s, wars and 
conflicts on the whole have been less fatal – with the exception of genocides, for example 
in the 1990s in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. But even though the incidences of war 
and the numbers of victims are declining, it is characteristic of the conflicts of the 21st 
century that they are carried out on the intra-state level with fierce brutality, particularly 
against civilians; that there are numerous conflict parties which contribute to the 
complexity of the these conflicts; and that violence persists on a rather low level for a long 
time. These forms of conflicts are often described as “new wars”. However, research has 
proved that the indicators for these “new wars” already existed during the Cold War in 
form of numerous proxy wars (Newman 2004: 173-190). 
It was precisely this brutalization of conflicts and targeted violence against the civilian 
population which motivated the development of humanitarian arms control. Landmines 
– and in particular anti-personnel landmines – were being deployed in intra-state 
conflicts on a regular basis. These weapons were originally developed as tactical defensive 
weapons for conventional warfare, but were being increasingly “misappropriated” and 
used for offensive purposes against the opposing civilian population, thereby violating 
central principles of international humanitarian law. This change in the form of warfare 
with the use of mines became apparent in the 1990s, primarily in the conflicts in Angola 
and Mozambique as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Humanitarian aid organizations were 
confronted with the effects of the indiscriminate use of mines against civilians and the 
consequences for post-conflict reconstruction. This was the scenario which prompted 
them to develop the idea of an arms control initiative beyond international humanitarian 
law (Wisotzki/Müller: 1997: 12). 
Despite the reduction in the number of conflicts, the illicit proliferation of small arms12 
remains a global problem with numerous consequences for affected states and civil 
 
 
11  www.humansecuritycentre.org (5.10.2009). 
12  Small arms (and light weapons) are considered to be “any portable barreled weapon that expels, is 
designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an 
explosive”. The Firearms Protocol of 2000 also includes in its definition “parts and components” as well as 
“ammunition”. Cf.: Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, A/Res/55/255, Article 3. The 2001 Action Programme on Small Arms 
dispensed with a definition of its own because the negotiating states were unable to reach an agreement. 
Although it adopted the definition from the Firearms Protocol, it excluded the term “ammunition”. 
Whenever this report speaks of “small arms” it always means “small arms and light weapons”. 
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societies. The international community is faced with a tremendous task in view of an 
estimated 639 million small arms and light weapons in circulation throughout the world. 
Small arms have become the most important tool of violence in intra-state conflicts and 
civil wars in particular – they also can be used to target the civilian population. This 
practice does not only violate international humanitarian law, but also important 
principles of universal human rights. 500,000 people are killed every year as a result of 
bullet wounds, 300,000 are wounded in intra-state conflicts and a further 200,000 become 
victims of violent crime or commit suicide using pistols or rifles. Violations of human 
rights using or involving small arms are an everyday reality and an important incentive 
for norm-building activities.13 
While the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms is in itself not the immediate cause 
of conflict, it nevertheless provides considerable potential for the escalation of violence. 
Weapons continuously pass borders in the crisis regions of Africa due to poorly trained 
police forces and the lack of transfer and border controls, and are thus trafficked from one 
conflict to another. Small arms and light weapons also pose a great danger in post-conflict 
situations. Without disarmament programs, they jeopardize individual security, increase 
the risk of new hostilities by up to 44 percent, and lead to high levels of violent crime and 
massive human rights violations (IANSA 2006). High numbers of small arms in societies 
also inhibit peace-building processes and thwart the objectives of development aid. A 
correlation between state failure and large numbers of weapons is to be observed in 
regions with fragile statehood (Byman/Van Evera 1998: 381-400). All in all, these factors 
lead to an increased regime demand. This need intensified following 9/11 and the 
awareness of the link between terrorism and the proliferation of light weapons. Non-state 
actors in Afghanistan and Iraq have repeatedly deployed man-portable air defense 
systems (MANPADS) against the allied forces (Wisotzki 2007). 
Cluster bombs and cluster munitions have a similar indiscriminate effect as anti-
personnel mines, but are usually deployed in inter-state wars. Since the end of World War 
II, cluster munitions have been used in approximately 25 wars; for example by the United 
States in Vietnam, but also in wars in the 1990s or in the 21st century: in the second Gulf 
War in 1991, by NATO forces in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan. According to 
estimates, approximately 2 million cluster bombs were dropped during the last Iraq war 
alone. Cluster bombs are an important means of air-borne tactical warfare, they help to 
avoid casualties on ones side, and are cost efficient. These aims of conventional warfare 
collide with the central principles of international humanitarian law and universal human 
rights. The use of cluster munitions violates the norms of proportional warfare, which 
differentiate between the civilian population and combatants. The submunitions of 
cluster bombs have a relatively high failure rate of 10 to 15 percent. Long after the end of 
hostilities, these unexploded submunitions are even more deadly than anti-personnel 
 
 
13  These figures are based on estimates; reliable numbers are not available as a result of weapons traded 
illegally and gaps in the statistics on violent crime in numerous countries.  
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mines, and kill and maim civilians, especially children. Even modern types of cluster 
munitions with self-destructing mechanisms can fail, as the incidents in Lebanon have 
shown. In the 2006 war against Hezbollah, Israel dropped an estimated 2.8 to 4 million 
cluster bomblets over Lebanon – Hezbollah, for its part, also resorted to these weapons in 
the fight against Israel. In Afghanistan, the number of unexploded ordnance in the war 
against the Taliban is estimated at approximately 40,000 pieces – this is tantamount to a 
humanitarian catastrophe in a country that is already highly contaminated with anti-
personnel mines. The Oslo Process, which led to the ban on cluster munitions, was the 
result of the dissatisfaction of like-minded states with the existing regulations under 
international humanitarian law at the time. Also in the case of anti-personnel mines, like-
minded states had sought to establish improved norms within the context of international 
humanitarian law. Ultimately, however, it was the inadequacies of international 
humanitarian law which led to the establishment of alternative institutions in both cases.  
3.1  Norms within the framework of humanitarian international law 
The precursors of the three regimes can be found in international humanitarian law 
which deals inter alia with the protection of the civilian population during war. Earlier 
considerations concerning limitations on the use of means of violence can be identified in 
all cultures dating back to the ancient world, for example in the code of honor and 
knightly ideals from the Middle Ages, or the idea of “just warfare” in the philosophy of 
Augustine and Hugo Grotius. The concept of “limited warfare” was first introduced into 
international humanitarian law in the 19th century. International humanitarian law is 
based on the principle of regulating the forms of the use of violence, that is to say, 
subjecting the “how” in warfare to certain restrictions and thus limiting the methods and 
means of combat in armed conflicts. According to the principle of military necessity, 
warfare should be limited to the use of those means of violence which are absolutely 
necessary in order to achieve certain military aims. Two general principles can be derived 
from this: 1. A restriction of the use of violence to military targets, sparing the civilian 
population. 2. A ban on the use of particularly cruel weapons which cause serious injury, 
such as dum-dum bullets, which were outlawed at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907 (Green 1993). Despite a number of conventions regulating types of weapons 
and their use, international humanitarian law is confronted with the problem of the 
continuous development of new military technologies, which, as a consequence, always 
imply a need for further improvement of the humanitarian norms. The greatest dilemma 
facing international humanitarian law, however, is the fact that it is caught between the 
conflicting priorities of military necessity and humanitarian concerns. Negotiated 
solutions which are agreed upon by all state parties on the basis of the principle of 
consensus often fail to meet the demands of those states which are particularly committed 
to arms controls. This also applies to transnational non-governmental organizations.  
This ambivalence in lawmaking is also reflected in the examples of anti-personnel 
mines and cluster bombs. Within the framework of international humanitarian law the 
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international community of states could only manage to agree on certain restrictions 
concerning the use of these weapons. At the initiative of the French President Mitterrand, 
the problem of anti-personnel mines was originally to be negotiated under the 1980 
Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons (CCW), 
which lists particularly cruel conventional weapons, including landmines (Protocol II). 
Whilst this Protocol mentions the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, it does not 
regulate the production, storage and export of this category of weapons. It bans among 
other things the indiscriminate planting of mines if there is no direct connection to 
military operations. However, in practice, this regulation provided inadequate protection 
for the civilian population: Overall, too many exceptions weakened the Protocol’s 
effectiveness. Moreover, the three negotiation sessions of the CCW Review Conferences 
in 1995 and 1996 did not provide the much-hoped-for breakthrough. As with the original 
Protocol, efforts to enhance the effectiveness of international humanitarian law were 
thwarted by military interests. State parties tried to identify loopholes for those mines 
which they considered to be of military relevance for their countries. The western 
industrial nations called for exemptions for their “intelligent” mines because they 
contained a self-destruction mechanism and were therefore not considered dangerous in 
post-conflict settings. These states stigmatized plastic mines as the real threat, prompting 
vehement opposition from Russia, China, India and Pakistan as the main producers of 
these types of mines. These differences in positions were solely based on national interests 
and prevented an agreement on a comprehensive ban on all anti-personnel mines in the 
Revised Protocol II. Nevertheless, the parties did succeed in extending the regulations 
governing anti-personnel mines to include intra-state conflicts, thus expanding the scope 
of international humanitarian law to also cover this type of conflict. The obligation to 
map the location of mines is also intended as a means of providing better protection for 
the civilian population; the same applies to a ban on the use of plastic mines. 
Nevertheless, this example demonstrates the ambivalence of international humanitarian 
law, wanting, on the one hand, to protect civilians in situations of war and, on the other 
hand, being constrained by efforts to safeguard national military and security interests.  
The story of the Cluster Munitions Convention is very similar. In principle, Protocol I 
of the 1949 Geneva Convention already implies a ban on the use of cluster munitions. In 
principle, the Protocol bans attacks using indiscriminate weapons, although it does not 
specifically mention cluster munitions.14 In November 2003, the international community 
of states negotiated Protocol V on the marking and clearance of explosive remnants of 
war within the framework of the CCW. This completely new norm of international 
humanitarian law entered into force in November 2006 and, in the meantime, has been 
ratified by 23 states (including Germany). However, Protocol V does not include any 
general provisions banning the use of cluster munitions (Justen 2007: 1-4; van 
Woudenberg 2008: 455).  
 
 
14  Cf. Footnote 4. 
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The reasons for the demand for a regime regarding humanitarian arms control norms 
are thus obvious: Within the framework of international humanitarian law it has proven 
impossible to reconcile the conflicting interests of the various states. Although 
international humanitarian law is also concerned with strengthening humanitarian 
norms, efforts are often undermined by national security interests. Humanitarian arms 
control norms could be established in this particular form as a result of the inability of 
existing institutional forums, including international humanitarian law, to meet the 
demands of those states concerned with arms controls. These states initially opted for 
norm-building efforts within the framework of international humanitarian law. Germany, 
for example, originally proposed negotiating a ban on cluster munitions as a further 
protocol to the CCW.  
International humanitarian law also serves as a reference base for the arms control 
efforts of non-governmental organizations in two respects: On the one hand, the NGOs 
refer to the importance of protecting civilians as the central principle of international 
humanitarian law. At the same time, they take advantage of the failures and deficits of the 
norms negotiated within this framework and use them as a starting point for their own 
efforts to introduce recommendations for alternative arms control institutions.  
4.  The norm-generating stakeholders of humanitarian arms 
control 
One particular characteristic of humanitarian arms control is its norm-generating 
stakeholders, also called norm entrepreneurs, who are particularly active in developing 
new institutions. What is striking about all three regimes is the fact that small and 
medium-sized states committed themselves to negotiating a new arms control agreement 
in close cooperation with transnational networks of non-governmental organizations. 
Moreover, they succeeded despite the declared opposition of major powers. NGOs made 
the start by identifying the demand for a regime and regulatory gaps. They received 
support by international organizations, particularly the United Nations. Together, they 
managed to achieve a change in discourse, since concurring interpretations regarding the 
security and military relevance of these weapons existed in all three cases. The NGO 
campaigns initially also met with opposition from the later like-minded states which they 
had to convince through “better” arguments. Together with these like-minded states, they 
then sought to increase the group of supportive states. This form of “new diplomacy” 
seems to have proven of value for humanitarian arms control (Cooper 2002). States as 
well as non-state actors each provided resources which the other side considered useful 
for its own efforts of persuasion. With the support of the NGOs the states reached out to 
the public and managed to achieve a certain degree of legitimacy for their actions. In 
return, the like-minded states granted NGOs access to the negotiations and, some, albeit 
limited, influence of shaping the regime (Deitelhoff/Wisotzki 2004). One important 
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precondition for the process of persuasion was a sophisticated rhetoric which resonated 
with the public. 
4.1  The discursive context: Argumentative starting points for norm 
development  
For the norm entrepreneurs in humanitarian arms control the question of justice in war, 
and particularly the abolition of moral injustice, served as an important means of 
persuasion. The norm-generating actors often sought to connect with existing normative 
standards, as will be seen in the following (Price 1998: 630). Non-governmental 
organizations fueled doubts about the proportionality of anti-personnel mines or cluster 
munitions and their use in wars. They especially pointed to their inability to discriminate 
between combatants and non-combatants in order to achieve a total ban on these 
categories of weapons. In their discourses, they drew on the moral-philosophical debates 
on “just war”, which have their roots in the Christian scholastics, for example, in the 
writings of Augustine or of Thomas Aquinas. However, the “just war” debate is also cross-
cultural: “Nothing in it need be alien or repugnant to Muslims or Jews or those of other 
faiths...”15. Accordingly, war is “a highly regulated cultural institution” (Finnemore 1999: 
149-165) and in itself “an inherently normative phenomenon” (Bull 1977). The constantly 
growing body of principles, norms and regulations which have been codified in the course 
of the last 200 years in the form of international humanitarian law is based on this need to 
regulate violence in war. I have already shown in Chapter 2.1 that the dissatisfaction with 
the outcome of the negotiations on the CCW and its Protocols also formed an 
argumentative starting point for the NGO community. The demand for a complete ban 
on anti-personnel mines is also not without precedent. The campaigns repeatedly referred 
to the fact that the taboo on the use of chemical and biological weapons contributed to the 
treaty banning these weapons (Price 1998: 629). The NGOs argued in the case of anti-
personnel mines that states should stick to moral principles of “just war” and ban such 
weapons as they fail to discriminate between combatants and civilian population.  
The debate on an appropriate definition of security following the end of the Cold War 
also served the interests of the NGOs as it stood in line with their own convictions. As 
states in intra-state conflicts were unable or unwilling to ensure the safety of their citizens, 
the NGOs referred to the increased significance of the concept of individualized human 
security and called upon the community of states to act against indiscriminate warfare 
using anti-personnel mines. Since the 1994 United Nations Development Programme 
first used the term “human security” in the Report on Human Development to demand a 
 
 
15  Guthrie/Quinlan (2007: 8). The two authors thus reject the criticism of the “Just War Debate” that it 
referred to purely western values.  
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“peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War, this term has become the key concept for 
mobilizing an undeniably heterogeneous coalition middle-power states, NGOs and 
international organizations (Ulbert/Werthes 2008: 13). The debate on an appropriate, 
individualized security concept helped to heighten awareness of changing security policy 
needs at the international level.16 
4.2 The role of norm-generating stakeholders 
4.2.1  The role of non-governmental organizations 
Non-governmental organizations have secured themselves a solid position in 
international politics. Their well-designed campaigns and their moral rhetoric enable 
them to direct the attention of the world public and of their national clientele to 
normative regulatory gaps (Brühl 2003). As transnational campaigns, they set out to 
change the attitudes and views of states in order to persuade them to take action. In the 
past, NGOs were of limited relevance in the field of security policy and multilateral arms 
control and disarmament as the negotiations were dominated by states. Non-
governmental organizations came together to form transnational coalitions in the case of 
anti-personnel mines, the campaign to ban cluster bombs and the Action Programme on 
Small Arms. These types of transnational coalitions between non-governmental 
organizations are usually distinguished by their informal and international character. 
They are set up on the basis of common values and objectives in order to launch a 
campaign, to set the agenda on specific issues or, as in the case of humanitarian arms 
control, to bring about a multilateral agreement.17 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was founded in 1992 as a 
coalition of NGOs with a common goal: As humanitarian aid organizations, they were 
interested in curbing the effects of the unlimited and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel 
mines in intra-state conflicts such as in Cambodia or Angola and taking preventive action 
against the deliberate misuse of mines.18 In 1996 – at the height of the campaign – the 
ICBL had more than 600 members from 40 countries (Price 1998: 620). The International 
 
 
16  In the UNDP report, human security was deliberately broadly defined as “freedom from want” and 
“freedom from fear” (“community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal and political 
securities”). Cf. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/ (24.10.2009). 
17  Khagram/Riker/Sikkink differentiate in this context between transnational coalitions/campaigns, 
networks and movements which differ according to the degree of their organization: The first group 
demonstrates the characteristics of a coordinated course of action and joint strategies most strongly in 
their campaigning. Cf. Khagram et al. (2002: 7). 
18  Founding members of ICBL were Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (United States), 
Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (Great Britain), Physicians for Human Rights 
(United States) and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (United States), cf. Rutherford (2009: 133). 
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Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) also began in 1999 as a group of just a few 
NGOs and grew rapidly over the years. The coalition for the ban on cluster munitions is 
the most recent transnational network. Launched in 2003 and consisting of 300 members 
from more than 80 states, it was set up by founding members of the ICBL: Human Rights 
Watch and the ICBL itself. 
The three coalitions show some similarities with regard to their membership; they also 
pursue comparable strategies. All three campaigns put forward moral arguments in their 
efforts of persuasion, particularly by referring to the injustice of the use of weapons 
against civilians. Since the military and strategic relevance of these conventional weapons 
was undoubted at the beginning of the campaigns, all three networks were faced with the 
challenge of developing convincing arguments for restrictions of or a complete ban on 
these weapons. Therefore, the transnational NGO campaigns aimed at contrasting the 
military relevance of the weapons with the human suffering they cause in order to put 
their strategic relevance into perspective and successfully discredit them in public. The 
arguments were based on existing ethical and normative standards such as the 
proportionality of war within the framework of international humanitarian law and 
pointed to the indiscriminate effect of the weapons, the suffering of the civilian 
population and the socio-economic consequences of the misuse of weapons. The drastic 
description of these “conditions of injustice” helped to draw world public attention to this 
topic. This process led to the stigmatization of the weapons and was the starting point for 
the norm-building processes (Borrie et al. 2009: 20). 
IANSA members always referred to the fact that the use of small arms in wars and 
post-war situations helps to violate human rights, undermines individual security and 
diminishes the effectiveness of development aid (IANSA 2006: 57; Wisotzki 2008: 34). 
They also publicly denounced the weapons-producing industries and western 
democracies which produce weapons and export them to the Third World. The 
significance of human security was emphasized by depicting the individual and personal 
suffering of victims of mines, cluster bombs or firearms. The aim of the NGOs was to 
obtain an emotional impact – even on the diplomats involved in the negotiations (Price 
1998: 622). 
Whereas the campaigns were always based on actions with strong public outreach 
effects – particularly at the national level – they also became experts in multilateral 
negotiations and put forward their own ideas and proposals in the course of the 
negotiations. It was the NGOs that focused the attention of the negotiations on questions 
of distributive justice, for example on the special needs of affected states and civil society. 
In the case of the Ottawa Convention, for example, they succeeded in convincing the state 
parties to commit themselves to include the funding of victim rehabilitation programs as 
a norm in the Convention. IANSA drafted, inter alia, its own version of the PoA, 
expressing the ideas of the transnational network. IANSA members organized regular 
meetings of experts with diplomatic representatives, for example, in Geneva, in order to 
reach an understanding about the possibilities and limits of the PoA.  
Ideas of justice, or evidence of injustice, were thus important arguments for the non-
governmental organizations, helping them to mobilize public opinion in their home 
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constituencies and reach governments via this indirect route. Even though norm-building 
took place at the international level, the transnational networks used their national 
platforms for their efforts of persuasion. Only when they had succeeded in convincing a 
number of small and medium-sized powers of the necessity of independent action did 
norm-building begin to make decisive progress, at least in the case of anti-personnel 
mines and cluster munitions.  
4.2.2  From opponents of negotiations to norm-generating actors: Small and 
medium-sized powers  
The small and medium-sized powers are important actors in establishing norms of 
humanitarian arms control. They assumed the role of the norm-generating stakeholders 
on the side of the states and, in the case of the conventions on anti-personnel mines and 
cluster bombs, ensured that both regimes were negotiated outside existing forums. Whilst 
Canada assumed the leading role in the Ottawa Process, Norway initiated the Oslo 
Process which led to the ban on cluster munitions. The two states did not shoulder these – 
by the standards of arms control negotiations – extraordinary processes alone, but were 
accompanied, or supported, by a number of like-minded states in a kind of “job-sharing” 
exercise.19  
However, even the most committed advocates of this new kind of arms control were 
initially outright opponents of a ban and skeptical towards the transnational NGO 
networks. It was the failure, or rather the lack of results, of the protocol negotiations 
within the framework of the CCW that opened a “window of opportunity” for the 
alternative negotiating processes. The Mine Action Group had previously employed great 
efforts of persuasion, particularly in Canada, and had found a prominent advocate in 
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, for whom a ban on anti-personnel mines was a matter 
of personal moral conviction. Furthermore, both Canada and Norway were founders of 
the “Human Security Network”, whose aim was to shape a “just and peaceful world 
order” with the help of new (development cooperation) initiatives.20 The group of like-
minded states which was influential in steering the Ottawa Process consisting of Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
the Philippines, Peru, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland. Whilst Canada assumed a 
leading role, other states, for example, Belgium and Germany, had already implemented 
moratoriums on the export and/or production and use of anti-personnel mines in 1995. 
The Oslo Process to ban cluster munitions was steered by a similar group of states: 
 
 
19  Austria, for example, presented the first draft version of the subsequent anti-personnel mine convention; 
Belgium, Germany and Norway hosted the conferences of states parties. South Africa organized a regional 
conference to persuade African states. (Rutherford 2009:128ff). 
20  Cf. www.humansecuritynetwork.org (15.8.2009). 
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Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Vatican and Norway. These groups of 
like-minded states assumed different functions; for example, drafting the text of the 
conventions or organizing state conferences.  
Norm-building in the realm of small arms and light weapons developed along quite 
different lines. There were never any doubts about the legitimacy of state security needs 
and thus about the legal possession of small arms. The aim was not to negotiate an actual 
ban, but to limit the illicit trafficking of arms – particularly involving non-state actors – 
and to provide help for the affected states. Even the norm-seeking stakeholders with the 
greatest interest in an agreement advocated negotiations within the framework of the 
United Nations. A number of states called for more comprehensive norms but did not 
succeed due to the principle of consensus on which the negotiations were based. The 
group of like-minded states originally consisted of Belgium, Canada, Japan, Mali, 
Norway, South Africa and Switzerland. They favored various elements of a control regime 
for quite different reasons: Mali, for example, as a state which is particularly affected by 
the proliferation of small arms as a consequence of violent, internal conflicts, had initiated 
a moratorium on imports and exports and on the production of small arms within the 
framework of the ECOWAS states in 1998 and was interested in an universalization of 
these norms (Wisotzki 2000: 232). In South Africa, the national NGO network, SACBL, 
had a prominent supporter in Nelson Mandela at its head and many top bureaucrats at 
his side. Their shared past in the anti-apartheid movement made it easier for members to 
gain access to decisive government agencies which, in turn, were open for “humanitarian 
issues” (Rutherford 2003: 30). 
4.2.3  The third group involved: The role of international organizations 
The United Nations and regional as well as sub-regional organizations were important 
stakeholders for the three norm-generation processes. On the one hand, they succeeded 
in highlighting problems, as was the case with the United Nations. On the other hand, the 
regional organizations in particular developed problem-specific solutions whose scope 
was usually wider than that of the global regime. This applies in particular to the problem 
complex of small arms. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made a start in 1995 by 
commissioning a group of experts to study the problems connected with the illicit 
trafficking and proliferation of small arms. In its report, the group recommended the 
normative regulation of this problem within a global framework. With UNGA Resolution 
54/54V at the end of 1999, the Member States established the preconditions for the 
negotiations on the PoA. The previous year, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA) had established a mechanism to coordinate action to control small arms 
(CASA) in order to serve, on the one hand, as an UN-internal contact point – also for 
peace-keeping missions – and, on the other hand, to later assume responsibility for 
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implementing the PoA.21 The United Nations also made its field experience available 
within the framework of the Oslo Process. It supported the transnational NGO campaign 
in its efforts to outlaw these types of weapons. Compared to the Ottawa Process, giving 
expertise and doing lobbying work has considerably increased within the UN bodies 
(Borrie et al. 2009: 20). 
One should not underestimate the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in 
substantiating the need for a regime as well as in implementing this institution. For 
example, the Member States of the European Union focused their attention at a very early 
stage on the problem of illicit trafficking of small arms and were one to the most 
important driving forces behind the PoA. The EU Member States had already developed 
the Program on Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms in 1997. This was intended, 
among other things, to strengthen national export control legislation and encourage 
cooperation with third party states. A year later, the EU States approved the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports and strongly supported the introduction of a norm to control 
legal arms exports during the negotiation process on the PoA. The OSCE also became a 
normative stakeholder by agreeing on numerous measures to fight the illicit trafficking of 
small arms. The OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons is 
of particular importance for the implementation of the PoA and contains overviews of the 
necessary control standards as guidelines in eight fields relevant to proliferation, for 
example, export controls.  
The PoA was negotiated by consensus and the many regulatory gaps resulting from 
the opposition of individual states had to be accepted. It was for this reason that other 
regional and sub-regional organizations, in Africa for example, proceeded to introduce 
their own framework agreements on SALW controls. These included the ECOWAS 
Protocol on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which stipulates that 
Member States should provide neither of these items to non-state actors. In June 2006 it 
became the ECOWAS Convention on SALW and thus a legally-binding document for the 
whole West African region. The 2004 Nairobi Protocol also includes significant efforts 
towards the harmonization of small arms control between states in the Great Lakes region 
and the Horn of Africa. It subjects the private possession of weapons to new legislative 
procedures – a gap which could not be closed in the global norm-building process of the 
global PoA.22 All in all, these examples demonstrate that international and regional 
organizations assumed important functions in the evolution of norms and in the further 
differentiation of the provisions of the PoA. In the specific case of the United Nations, the 
staff of UNODA contributed important expertise to the various negotiating processes and 
supported the norm-building efforts of the non-governmental organizations.23 
 
 
21  www.un-casa.org (24.10.2009). 
22  Cf. Chapter 6. 
23  See www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx. 
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5.  Characteristics of norm-building efforts in humanitarian arms 
control 
Humanitarian arms control is characterized by particular features which indicate a 
structural change in arms control and disarmament and which this Chapter will consider 
in more detail. In Chapter 4, I referred to the special cooperation between small and 
medium-sized powers and transnational networks of non-governmental organizations. 
After taking a look at the stakeholders, this Chapter will go on to focus on the normative 
settings of humanitarian arms control. The focus on human security mentioned above 
played a constitutive role for this new form of arms control, in which humanitarian 
principles were applied, for example to protect the civilian population and taking their 
special security needs into account. Various principles of justice also played an important 
role and were applied in the generation of norms. This Chapter will outline the genesis of 
the respective regime and will proceed to take a more detailed look at the structural 
change and the inherent principle of justice.  
In December 1997, 122 states signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 
so-called Ottawa Treaty. It banned the production, export, stockpiling and use of this 
category of weapons.24 Remaining stockpiles were to be destroyed within four years. The 
goal of clearing all anti-personnel mines in mined areas appears even more ambitious: 
The signatory states committed themselves to clearing all mines within ten years. Article 6 
of the Ottawa Treaty specifies financial and technical assistance for affected states. On the 
other hand, the Treaty forgoes the usual elements of classical arms control, for example, a 
sophisticated verification system. So-called “fact-finding missions” may be authorized 
upon suspicion of the violation of clauses of the Treaty, but otherwise the Convention is 
based on “soft” forms of verification: annual reports by the signatory states on the status 
of implementation, supplemented by the ICBL’s annual “Landmine Monitor”.  
As a result, the Convention devotes itself to the problems of mines in a very distinctive 
way and demonstrates the typical characteristics of humanitarian arms control. These 
include inter alia offering affected states assistance with mine clearance and focusing on 
victim rehabilitation: in other words, a change of perspective from state security to 
human security. On the whole, the Treaty attaches considerable importance to applying 
central principles of justice such as equality, proportionality, compensation and 
consideration of special needs. To start with, all states are called upon to refrain from the 
production, stockpiling, export and deployment of anti-personnel mines. Article 6 takes 
the principle of proportionality into account by including the right of those states which 
are particularly affected to both technical and financial assistance for mine clearance 
operations and measures to destroy stockpiles.  
 
 
24  Cf. www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm (5.10.2009). 
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Such strong results could only be achieved by setting-up a special negotiation process 
which was designed by Canada and other like-minded states. Initially, all interested states 
were entitled to participate in the negotiations, but at a certain point they had to commit 
themselves by signing a declaration (conference in Brussels in June 1997) stating they 
supported the Treaty: Only these signatory states were admitted to the final round of 
negotiations.  
Although a global ban on anti-personnel mines could not be achieved on this basis, 
there has nevertheless been an impressive decline in the number of landmine victims. A 
number of states, including major producers of anti-personnel mines such as China, 
Russia, the USA, India and Pakistan, did not accede to the Ottawa Convention. 
Nevertheless, they too are abiding by its norms and have so far not used or exported anti-
personnel mines. Furthermore, the United States has provided the world’s largest budget 
for mine clearance operations. It is too early to speak of a developing taboo because there 
have been violations of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Anti-Personnel Mines 
Convention has contributed to the stigmatization of these types of weapons.  
Of the 156 signatory states, 83 have destroyed their stocks, totaling 41.8 million anti-
personnel mines.25 The balance with regard to mine clearance is less straightforward: A 
large number of states were supposed to have cleared all anti-personnel mines on their 
territory by March 2009. Bulgaria, El Salvador, Swaziland and Macedonia can already 
report success. Heavily mined states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Mozambique 
will not be able to observe the deadline. Furthermore, a number of Western states have 
also been lax in enforcing the regulations, including Denmark and Great Britain, which 
still has to clear mines on the Falkland Islands.26 Meanwhile, 24 states which are seriously 
affected by mines have stated that they will be unable to observe the ten-year deadline due 
to lack of international support. These include Afghanistan, Burundi, Eritrea and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Whilst mine clearance is making progress, there is still a 
shortage of funds for victim rehabilitation measures.27 
The international campaign against cluster bombs was founded in November 2003 
with the aim of banning cluster munitions.28 The transnational NGO campaign received 
support from the EU Parliament, which passed a resolution in October 2004 calling upon 
its Member States to observe moratoriums unilaterally and to work internationally in 
support of a ban on cluster bombs. From 2006 onwards, Belgium, Norway and Austria 
were the first states to speak out in favor of the ban on cluster munitions. Following the 
disappointing results of the Protocol V negotiations of the CCW, the Norwegian 
 
 
25  Cf. www.icbl.org/news/sd_bckgr and www.apminebanconvention.org/en/background-status-of-the-
convention/destroying-stockpiled-mines/ (16.5.2009). 
26  Cf. www.icbl.org/news/treaty_deadlines_bckgr (16.3.2009). 
27  Cf. www.apminebanconvention.org/en/background-status-of-the-convention/assisting-the-victims/ (16.3.2009). 
28  In the meantime, according to its own figures, the campaign includes more than 250 non-governmental 
organizations from 70 countries. Cf. www.clustermunitions.org (6.10.2009).  
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government copied the Canadian example and launched the Oslo Process. Like the 
Ottawa Process, the ban on cluster munitions was initiated outside the negotiating forums 
of the United Nations. The like-minded states assumed different responsibilities. The 
process was brought to a successful end in Dublin/Republic of Ireland in May 2008 
following five meetings of states parties.  
Like the Ottawa Convention, the Oslo Convention took the aspect of human security 
into account by including an article on victim rehabilitation. Elements of procedural 
fairness were reflected in the institutional design of the negotiating process: The non-
governmental organizations were granted participation rights, thus recognizing their key 
role in the talks in the run-up to the actual negotiations. The design of the Treaty took 
into account principles of distributive justice, proportionality, the recognition of 
particular needs and compensation. For example, the costs-by-cause principle applies to 
the clearance of cluster munitions and includes the obligation to provide comprehensive 
assistance to those states on whose territory these weapons were deployed. Moreover, 
donor countries are called upon to provide comprehensive technical and financial 
support and to take into account the socio-economic rehabilitation of the mined areas.  
Whereas it was possible to negotiate a complete ban on anti-personnel mines and 
cluster bombs, this vision was never even considered as realistic in the case of SALW – 
due to the legitimate security interests of all states which need to keep these weapons for 
equipping their national police and armed forces. Nevertheless, the 2001 PoA sets out to 
tackle the problem of the illicit trafficking of SALW in a variety of ways.29 A politically 
binding action program was agreed upon in New York, calling upon all states to institute 
preventive and reactive measures to stop the uncontrolled and unlimited proliferation of 
small arms. The aim of the Action Programme is to tackle the causes of demand for and 
supply of small arms.30  
The reasons for demand of SALW are to be found primarily in the relationship 
between weak statehood, economic deprivation, and conflicts over resources in an 
increasingly regional and transnational dimension. On the supply side, one has to take 
into account the various forms of globalized licit and illicit trade in small arms. A major 
part of today’s stocks of weapons, especially in the conflict regions of sub-Saharan Africa, 
date back to the period of the Cold War when both superpowers supplied their clientele 
states with military aid and weapons in order to secure their own influence (Laurance 
1998: 22; Wisotzki 2000: 223). After 1989, the members of the former Warsaw Pact and 
NATO reduced their armies and conventional weaponry. Surplus weapons reached 
conflict regions via direct or indirect routes (Volman 1998: 150-163). According to 
estimates, legal state trade accounts for 8 million small arms per year (Small Arms Survey 
 
 
29  Cf. Report by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 27. August 1997, A./52/298 and 
Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 19. August 1999, A/52/258. 
30  Cf. Chapter 4 for details. 
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2003: 98). This leads to the constant proliferation of pistols and machine guns in crisis 
regions, as the delivery of Chinese weapons to Zimbabwe in April 2008 demonstrated.31 
The lack of global and binding norms regulating the legal trade in small arms is probably 
the greatest weakness of the PoA in its current form. There are also problems due to 
manufacturing licenses which western democracies as well as the former Soviet Union 
have allocated to Third World countries for the production of small arms. Finally, the 
supply side is also controlled by non-state actors: by professional arms dealers, organized 
crime and illegal local manufacturers (Small Arms Survey 2003: 97-116). 
The Programme of Action tries to tackle these complex relationships. In addition to 
improving or restoring state security through arms control measures, the PoA sets out to 
improve the individual security of citizens. It provides various initiatives at the global, 
regional and state level such as national contact points and coordination agencies in order 
to facilitate inter-state cooperation, particularly between donor and recipient countries. 
This structural change is enhanced by the provision of technical and financial aid to states 
which are particularly affected by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.  
A further norm calls upon states to get an overview of their stocks of SALW, being 
held by the police and the national army. Surplus stocks are to be destroyed instead of 
being sold to third parties. Illegal production as well as the illicit possession, trade and 
transfer of small arms should be made punishable. Cooperation at the regional level 
should be improved: For example, national rules and regulations governing the transfer of 
SALW should be coordinated and harmonized at the regional level.  
Unlike classical arms control agreements,32 the Programme of Action does not have 
any verification mechanisms – instead it was agreed to have biennial meetings of state 
parties. The states met in 2003 and 2005 to present a status report on the progress made in 
implementing the Action Programme (UNIDIR 2003). However, the discrepancies 
between the extensive reports presented by the states and the norms and measures which 
they had actually introduced became apparent at the first Review Conference in July 2006. 
For example, 102 countries stated that they were attending to the security of state 
stockpiles and had relevant standards and procedures. Yet only 30 states have reviewed or 
improved these standards. In weak states, poorly paid soldiers and police forces use these 
stockpiles to conduct a lucrative business, and one must be cautious in dealing with at 
least some of the national reports. The weaknesses of the PoA also became apparent in the 
area of transfer controls where there is an absence of global standards which could serve 
as a guide for the international community of states. The number of disarmament 
processes also appears inadequate: only 62 states have conducted disarmament in the field 
of small arms, 73 have destroyed surplus weapons.33 
 
 
31  Cf. www.iansa.org/regions/safrica/ZimShipment.htm (23.5.2008). 
32  The only exception here is the biological weapons regime. Cf. Becker et al. (2005). 
33  Cf. www.international-alert.org/pdfs/BtB_global.pdf (19.5.2009). 
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The Programme of Action on Small Arms combines different forms of distributive 
justice. For one, the principle of equality dominates: According to this principle, all states 
must review their legal stocks of small arms, close legal gaps and present regular reports 
on the implementation of the PoA to the United Nations. Apart from the principle of 
equality, the Programme of Action also takes into account the principle of proportionality 
and the differences in the needs of the member states. Accordingly, it contains norms and 
rules for handling small arms in post-conflict situations: The focus here is on 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs. Weak states which are affected 
by the high proliferation of small arms may receive assistance for their national programs 
from the donor countries. Measures to deal with the vicious cycle of violence and to 
remove weapons from society are to be implemented at the local level in cooperation with 
the civilian population.  
Subsequent UN working groups succeeded in drafting two further politically binding 
documents on SALW control: An instrument on the marking and tracing of newly 
produced small arms was adopted in 2005 as well as norms to regulate brokerage by non-
state actors, according to which they are subject to the national legislation of their native 
countries.34 Two further groups of UN experts have been set up to think about solutions 
for important sub-issues of small arms proliferation. The UN Group of Experts which is 
to draft recommendations for dealing with the issue of conventional ammunition 
stockpiles in surplus met under German chairmanship in the first half of 2008. Incidents 
in Mozambique in March 2007, or in Albania a year later, demonstrated that such 
ammunition stockpiles represent a considerable danger to the people. A further UN 
Group of Experts has developed ideas on the question of a global standard for controls on 
transfers of conventional weapons. In this case a transnational NGO campaign also took 
over the agenda setting and is currently monitoring the progress towards the resumption 
of negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty.35 
6.  Handling norm conflicts 
Humanitarian arms control is characterized by certain moral principles and principles of 
justice. This Chapter will take a look at the conflicts in norm development which 
determine both the processes of negotiations and the implementation of norms. It will 
demonstrate the ambivalence in norm-generation efforts in humanitarian arms control: 
the moral aspirations of the transnational campaigns of the non-governmental 
organizations in particular are thwarted by state’s particularistic national security 
 
 
34  Cf. http://disarmament.un.org/CAB/salw-oewg.html (22.5.2009). 
35  Cf. www.controlarms.org (23.5.2009). 
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interests. Powerful states such as the United States, Russia and China opposed the norm-
building processes on the grounds of national interests and, in some cases, blocked 
important norms or turned them into an object of conflict. It should be mentioned that 
opponents to norm-building include both democracies and non-democracies. One would 
expect democracies in particular to be especially committed to the development of norms 
in the field of humanitarian arms control because the underlying moral convictions and 
normative principles closely resonate with democratic values (cf. Becker et al. 2008: 810-
854). Quite to the contrary, an ambivalence between norm-building efforts and national 
interests can be identified, such as in the case of the United States, particularly under the 
Bush administration. The opponents of certain norms of humanitarian arms control were 
able to dominate the negotiating processes – the explanatory variables in this case are the 
particular venue for the negotiations and the respective procedural principles: The more 
consensual the institutional framework, the weaker the negotiated outcomes and thus the 
norm-building processes. 
6.1  Norm conflicts in the three negotiating processes 
With the anti-personnel mines convention and the ban on cluster munitions, it was 
possible to negotiate two regimes banning entire categories of weapons. Decisive for the 
success of these regimes were the respective negotiating processes which the like-minded 
states established outside existing institutions such as the United Nations or the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament. However, the legitimacy of these processes was not 
undisputed. The United States, Great Britain, Australia and France, together with a 
number of other states, tried to launch a negotiation initiative parallel to the Ottawa 
Process within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They aimed 
for a regime with a limited range which would have banned only the transfer of anti-
personnel mines. This attempt failed, however, due to the general blockade on 
negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (Arms Control Reporter 1997: 
5). 
The differences in the institutional frameworks of the negotiating processes were also 
noticeable with regard to questions of procedural justice. While the transnational 
campaigns of the non-governmental organizations in the Ottawa and Oslo processes were 
involved in the negotiations right from their beginning, the PoA was mainly negotiated 
behind closed doors by state representatives without the direct involvement of civil 
society stakeholders, although a number of NGOs were certainly present in New York.  
Norm conflicts occurred over various aspects; first and foremost over the question of 
an appropriate definition of the respective category of weapon. The conflict between 
humanitarian views and tangible national military and security interests became 
particularly clear when negotiating the definition. The Ottawa Process had already 
experienced an intense struggle over the definition of those anti-personnel mines which 
were to be banned. To the immense displeasure of the ICBL, anti-tank mines with so-
called anti-handling devices are exempted from the ban. The definition issue was also the 
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subject of controversial discussion during the negotiations on the ban on cluster 
munitions. Germany had already presented a three-phase plan in the run-up, according 
to which dangerous munitions with a high rate of failure should be banned immediately 
and other cluster munitions within ten years. There were to be exemptions for so-called 
alternative munitions which “took into account the protection of the civilian population”. 
Germany received support from Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland – and thus from states which also produce these alternative cluster 
munitions. The German Ministry of Defense justified this definition, stating that these 
high-accuracy munitions did not have indiscriminate area effects and were extremely 
reliable in distinguishing between military and civilian targets. It was necessary to 
maintain these munitions in order to be able to meet national NATO commitments 
within the framework of current operations. There was opposition to this proposed 
definition from African and Latin American countries, which referred to the injustice of 
such a definition as they were not in a position to restock their arsenals with expensive 
high-tech munitions (Aktionsbündnis Landminen.de 2008:3). Paragraph 2c finally 
specifies which types of cluster munitions are not covered by the ban: They must contain 
fewer than ten explosive submunitions, which weigh less than four kilograms and 
furthermore are equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism. As far as 
Germany was concerned, accession to the Treaty means that it has to destroy 95 percent 
of its cluster munitions. Article 21/3 also triggered norm conflicts: This stipulates that 
states parties may cooperate in military alliances with states not party to the Convention, 
even though these activities may violate the rules of the Oslo Convention and involve the 
use of cluster bombs. This norm, too, is based on considerations of alliance cohesion as 
well as on experience with the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, where the lack of a 
corresponding norm led to legal problems during NATO missions.  
The question of a definition of small arms was also a huge stumbling block in the 
negotiations on the PoA, which is why the parties resorted to an existing definition: The 
state parties adopted the definition of the 2000 UN Firearms Protocol. The greatest norm 
conflicts in the negotiating process on the Programme of Action were over the meaning 
of illicit trafficking and as to what extent it should also include legal, state-to-state 
transfers. Whereas the EU Member States in particular were in favor of such a wide 
definition, opposition came from the US, Russian and Chinese delegations. The United 
States also refused to accept a norm on domestic gun control and a ban on the transfer of 
small arms to non-state actors, which the African states in particular had advocated. Due 
to the consensus system of UN negotiations, these norms and provisions had to be left out 
of the PoA. This is generally perceived as a serious weakness of a program which is in any 
case only politically binding.  
Military security interests had already been of key importance for the United States in 
the Ottawa Process and the US also tried to seek exemptions in the final negotiation 
round at Oslo. The United States’ position on the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention was 
ambivalent from the very beginning. On the one hand, former US-President Clinton 
shared the moral conviction and the humanitarian interests of the US-based NGOs; on 
the other hand, the US Department of Defense insisted on the protection of national 
security interests and the retention of mine capabilities. First of all, an attempt was made 
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to set up alternative negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, but then 
Clinton yielded to pressure from the national NGO campaign to take part in the final 
negotiations in Oslo. The supreme commanders of the US armed forces, who had 
previously been consulted, instructed the negotiating delegation to insist on the following 
conditions: An exemption for the use of anti-personnel mines along the Korean border; 
an extension of the transitional deadline of nine years during which technical alternatives 
can be developed; an exemption for anti-personnel mines which are used in conjunction 
with anti-vehicle mines, and the possibility of leaving the Treaty immediately in the case 
of “supreme national interests” (United States 1997: 1-3; Wareham 1998: 213). The 
realization of these demands would have seriously damaged the effectiveness of the Treaty 
– some of the like-minded groups of states, including Canada and Germany, tried to 
persuade the United States to join in order to enhance the universality of the ban and thus 
strengthen the legitimacy of the Treaty. But those states affected by anti-personnel mines 
in particular refused to comply with these hegemonic demands and were supported by 
the transnational campaign of the non-governmental organizations. The US delegation 
finally declared its withdrawal from the negotiations and the conflict of norms was solved 
in favor of a ban on anti-personnel mines with no exceptions.  
The specific form of the negotiations meant that it was possible to solve this normative 
conflict with an effective Treaty. The fact that the Ottawa Treaty was negotiated outside 
existing institutions meant that it was possible to circumvent the principle of consensus. 
This example clearly shows that more inclusive negotiation processes must not necessarily 
always lead to more effective institutions.  
Although hegemony and the attempt to enforce national interests failed in the case of 
the Anti-Personal Mine Convention, they did determine the negotiations on the PoA. 
Norm conflicts also dominated the first Review Conference in 2006 which sought to 
tackle the program’s weaknesses. Here too, the United States, but also other major powers 
refused to agree on common standards of transfer controls, the ban on non-state actors, 
and the regulation of the civilian possession of weapons. The future of the Action 
Programme was at stake when the United States also refused to agree to further biennial 
meetings of states to ensure the implementation of a rather weak program. In the end, the 
first Review Conference closed without a final document, which initially led to the further 
undermining of the Action Programme (Wisotzki 2006; Taylor 2006: 46). 
But it was not only the United States which provoked normative conflicts during the 
negotiating processes. National interests, for example, also determined China’s refusal to 
agree to the inclusion of a norm on the violation of human rights resulting from the 
misuse of weapons in the Preamble to the Programme of Action on Small Arms. The 
former non-aligned states, on the other hand, insisted on including the connection 
between small arms disarmament and nuclear disarmament in the Preamble to the 
Programme of Action, but were unable to assert themselves in the face of opposition from 
the P-5 states.  
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7.  Conclusion and outlook: The future of humanitarian arms 
control 
Fragile statehood, poverty and under-development, war economies, conflict over 
resources, terrorism, transnational organized crime and the privatization of security have 
all been named as core challenges of the 21st century. In this context, international 
attention is focusing increasingly on the problem of illicit trafficking and the 
indiscriminate use of certain forms of conventional weapons which inhibit the individual 
security of the civilian population as well as the socio-economic environment of the 
countries affected. The international community of states, together with the transnational 
campaigns of the non-governmental organizations, has begun to introduce new forms of 
arms control and disarmament in order to meet these challenges.  
This structural change towards humanitarian arms control and disarmament can be 
identified on the basis of certain indicators. Transnational campaigns by non-
governmental organizations and small and medium-sized countries are identified as the 
most important normative agents. Despite opposition from large powers such as the 
United States, Russia and China, these alliances succeeded in initiating negotiation 
processes which succeeded with a complete ban on an entire category of weapons in the 
case of anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs. This form of “new diplomacy” is 
characterized by the mutual provision of resources: Whereas states cooperated with 
NGOs in order to gain legitimacy, they in turn offered the civil society actors access rights 
to participate in the negotiating processes and thus a certain influence on the 
development of the new norms. International organizations such as the UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs helped to define the problem and the need for the regimes. Regional 
organizations established more extensive norms and regulations than would have been 
possible on a global level, particularly in the context of the uncontrolled proliferation of 
small arms. On the whole, a comparison of the three regimes of humanitarian arms 
control also demonstrates the importance of the institutional design of the negotiating 
processes and its consequences for norm development. The Ottawa and Oslo processes 
were deliberately established outside existing institutions in order to achieve faster 
negotiation results and more rigid bans. The Programme of Action on Small Arms, on the 
other hand, was not able to implement important norms in the face of opposition from a 
few states which led to the weaker development and implementation of norms.   
The change of perspective is also evident in the form of a different, individualized 
concept of security: The new arms control agreements correspond to the broader context 
of human security. They set out to mitigate the consequences of the misuse of weapons 
during and following conflicts, but also to enable states to gain control and sovereignty 
through security sector reforms. The new arms control regimes are to be seen in the 
context of a “new humanitarianism” whose central aim is to eliminate fundamental 
matters of injustice: the murder and wounding of innocent people and civilians who are 
not involved in the conflict. This humanitarianism is based on overriding moral 
principles such as the commitment to global solidarity in the case of massive violations of 
human rights. Issues of justice thus became the immediate basis for action and inspired 
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the development of norms at a global level; for example, in the field of international 
criminal jurisdiction or arms control. Questions of justice were taken into account in 
justifying the need for a regime when the indiscriminate use of conventional weapons was 
described as “injustice”. Principles of justice also played a decisive role in the processes of 
negotiation: Principles of just distribution had an effect on norm development itself and 
principles of procedural justice helped non-governmental organizations to participate in 
the negotiations in the context of providing assistance for the affected countries or 
victims.  
But ultimately the ambivalence of a moralistic effort to improve world affairs and 
particularistic national security interests revealed itself not only in international 
humanitarian law but also in the processes to negotiate these new forms of arms control 
and disarmament. The discrepancy between humanitarian causes and national interests 
was most blatant in the case of the PoA, where it was not even possible to close the 
normative gaps at the first Review Conference. The incongruity between normative 
declarations and their political realization was revealed in the implementation of the 
treaties and action programs: Although weapons were cleared, collected and destroyed, 
there was a lack of funds specifically for victim rehabilitation, that is to say, for the central 
issue of humanitarian arms control. In other words, although the principles of justice, 
proportionality, compensation and recognition of the particular needs of affected 
countries were an important incentive for the negotiations, in retrospect it is clear that the 
actual implementation and funding of these norms has been very laggard. 
There is still further need for state action at the level of norm-building. Probably the 
most serious shortcomings of the PoA are its lack of binding norms to regulate the legal 
transfer of small arms. The seizure of a ship with weapons from China destined for 
Zimbabwe by dock workers in South Africa in 2008 once again revealed the precarious 
status of the PoA, which does not regulate legal state transfers even when these weapons 
are exported to crisis and conflict regions. An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is now intended 
to close this normative gap. The initiative originated from a coalition of transnational 
non-governmental organizations in 2003. In October 2006, a large majority of states 
approved the first UN General Assembly resolution on such an arms trade treaty which is 
intended to develop global standards to regulate the import, export and transfer of 
conventional weapons. First of all, a group of experts was charged with testing the scope 
and limits of such an ATT. However, blatant differences between the 28 government 
representatives became obvious even at this stage; for example, over the question of the 
scope of the agreement, whether it should seek to be legally binding, or whether such an 
agreement, like the Action Programme on Small Arms, should not simply aim to be 
politically binding (da Silva 2009: 149). The group of experts was unable to answer the 
question of what principles and norms should regulate the global transfer of arms in the 
future – apparently the only point where agreement was reached was that the UN Charter 
with its general principles should serve as the basis for negotiations. The demands of the 
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coalition of non-governmental organizations go much further than this: Transfers of 
weapons should no longer be approved if the recipient country violates globally 
recognized principles (of justice), that is to say, violates universal human rights or 
international humanitarian law.36 These demands have received the support of a large 
majority of the community of states, including the Member States of the European Union, 
which made the EU Code of Conduct legally binding in 2008. The ATT could develop to 
become an important touchstone for humanitarian arms control since global standards 
for regulating the transfer of weapons touch the very nerve of state security interests. The 
UN Member States must now reveal how much importance they attach to humanitarian 
arms control and the recognition of universal global norms – such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights or international humanitarian law – and thus how much 
importance they attach to the central moral principles of a future world society.   
 
 
36  Cf. www.controlarms.org (12.9.2009). 
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